digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship

Articles & Chapters

2011

Statutory Arteriosclerosis
David Schoenbrod
New York Law School, david.schoenbrod@nyls.edu

Melissa Witte

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
Recommended Citation
Schoenbrod, David and Witte, Melissa, "Statutory Arteriosclerosis" (2011). Articles & Chapters. 1269.
https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters/1269

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

Statutory Arteriosclerosis
Should EPA set an air quality standard for
greenhouse gases? And why the arguments to the
contrary prove the Clean Air Act is obsolete
David Schoenbrod is a professor at New
York Law School, a visiting scholar at the
American Enterprise Institute, and was in
the 1970s an attorney at the Natural Resources Defense Council. Melissa Witte
practices law in New York.

C

ontroversy over how the Environmental Protection Agency should control
greenhouse gases through the Clean
Air Act has pitted the agency and some
environmental groups against other
environmental groups. The controversy is worth
understanding because it reveals a pivotal development that EPA and the environmental groups
would prefer to conceal: the 40-year-old Clean Air
Act is no longer a sensible way to regulate large-volume conventional air pollutants such as ozone and
particulate matter. Congress should replace the core
of this venerable statute and its State Implementation Plans with an updated, market-based approach
such as that proposed by Breaking the Logjam, a
joint project of New York Law School and New
York University School of Law to suggest reform of
our obsolescing environmental statutes. Reform of
the CAA would require legislators to take responsibility for choosing how fast to cut pollution and
how to allocate costs. Congressional accountability
would mean less power for EPA and environmental
groups — but better air quality and more economic
growth. Such reform would also ease eventual passage of much-needed greenhouse gas legislation.
EPA has opted to control greenhouse gases under a regulatory track of the CAA that limits it to
cutting emissions to the extent economically and
technologically feasible. That means, in practice, at
a pace that sits well politically. Some environmental
groups, however, want faster, more stringent regulation. Two such groups, the Center for Biological
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Diversity and 350.org, have petitioned EPA to invoke another regulatory track that would commit
the agency to reducing greenhouse gases to the extent sufficient to protect public health and the environment, regardless of the cost or blowback from
industry or voters. These provisions would require
EPA to set a National Ambient Air Quality Standard for greenhouse gases and to meet the NAAQS
through SIPs on a statutory timetable. Invoking
these provisions would limit EPA’s ability to bob
and weave to accommodate competing political
pressures.
EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson quickly voiced
disagreement with the CBD petition: “This agency has never believed that setting a [NAAQS] for
greenhouse gases was advisable.” Other environmental groups agree with her, even though such
organizations generally favor mandates that require
environmental agencies to achieve environmental
goals by a deadline. Jackson has said little in public about her reasons for opposing a NAAQS for
greenhouse gases. But the most important reason is
that SIPs are rigid, procedurally complicated, inefficient, and often ineffectual. This is an embarrassing
reason, however, because SIPs are at the center of
EPA’s current program to control the high-volume
conventional pollutants now subject to NAAQS.
Congress designed the Clean Air Act in 1970 so
that each harmful pollutant would be assigned to
one of three regulatory tracks.
The NAAQS track was reserved for harmful pollutants that come from “multiple or diverse sourcCopyright © 2011, Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, D.C. www.eli.org.
Reprinted by permission from The Environmental Forum®, Sept./Oct. 2011

es.” Examples named in 1970 included sulfur oxides
and particulates. This track establishes an elaborate
approach to these pollutants because achieving a
safe level everywhere requires taking account of the
combined effect of emissions from a variety of factories, other facilities, and vehicles. This track requires setting a NAAQS sufficient to protect health
and welfare, and achieving the NAAQS. To achieve
it, EPA must ensure each state has a SIP that regulates emissions from the various sources sufficiently
to bring pollution levels below the NAAQS everywhere. The states get some help from EPA, which
must impose national emission limits on new vehicles and new or modified stationary sources. These
national regulations, however, can cut emissions
only to the extent technologically and economically feasible and generally do not apply to existing
sources. EPA may also regulate fuels. The SIPs must
complete the job of achieving the health-based
NAAQS regardless of feasibility within a statutorily
set time period. This is the track that CBD wants
used for greenhouse gases.
The Hazardous Air Pollutant track was reserved
for pollutants that are not NAAQS pollutants but
are specially hazardous. Examples of HAPs included
asbestos and cadmium. Because these pollutants, by

definition, do not generally involve many sources
contributing to pollution concentrations at any
one place, the regulatory track skipped the elaborate SIPs and cut to the chase by ordering EPA to
set emission limits for these pollutants to prevent
harm. This is the track that EPA is applying to mercury in its recent rulemaking.
The “other” pollutant track is for whatever harmful pollutants are not NAAQS pollutants or HAPs.
Examples included nickel and selenium. These
leftover pollutants can be regulated under EPA’s
authority to set national emission limits on new
vehicles, new stationary sources, and fuels. Should
EPA regulate emissions of one of these “other” pollutants from new stationary sources, it is supposed
to require states to limit emissions from existing
stationary sources to the extent technologically and
economically feasible. This is the track that EPA is
applying to greenhouse gases.
The first two tracks require tougher regulation
than the third track. These “other” pollutants in
the third track are neither the target of the elaborate SIP planning apparatus nor regulated to the
extent necessary to prevent harm, as with NAAQS
or HAPs. This made sense because pollutants on
the third track come by definition from relatively
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few sources and pose no great hazard and so are
relatively unimportant.

T

he Environmental Protection Agency has
reacted to the congressional mandate to
take stringent action on the pollutants on
the first two tracks by trying to keep pollutants off them. The chief example has
been airborne lead. Lead in gasoline was the airpollution issue most on the public’s mind in 1970
when Congress established the three tracks. Lead
clearly came from “multiple or diverse sources.” After initially starting to set a NAAQS for lead, EPA
decided in 1971 to put lead on the third track so
that it would be free to walk a tightrope between
competing political pressures. However, the Second
Circuit held in 1976 that EPA was duty-bound to
set a NAAQS for airborne lead. (One of us, Schoenbrod, was a litigator for the environmental plaintiffs in the case.)
The agency also resisted putting pollutants on
the second track, and in many cases simply ignored
them until Congress in 1990 itself listed 189 pollutants for treatment under an amended version of
the second track.
As of 2008, the pollutants on the three tracks
were as follows:
• The NAAQS track: ozone, particulate matter,
carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide,
and lead.
• The HAPs track: asbestos, chlordane, mercury,
toluene, and 184 other pollutants.
• The “other” pollutant track: fluorides emitted
by aluminum plants and phosphate fertilizer plants,
and a few other relatively minor pollutants, each
emitted by a few source categories
In 2011, greenhouse gas emissions are the most
prominent pollution problem. With the Supreme
Court having required EPA to regulate them under
the Clean Air Act as a result of the Massachusetts
decision, the question becomes: on which track
should EPA put them?
In 2008, EPA under President George W. Bush
argued strenuously in an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that it was better to regulate
greenhouse gases under the “other” pollutant track
rather than the NAAQS track. In 2009, Administrator Jackson reached the same conclusion, referring to the position taken by the Bush EPA. Today EPA is controlling greenhouse gases under the
“other” pollutant track, the one designed for the
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least important pollutants. Thus, Bush-era reasons
for rejecting the NAAQS track still reign. These
reasons demonstrate that Congress should restructure the Clean Air Act’s treatment of conventional
NAAQS pollutants.
The ANPR argued that with increasing non-U.S.
emissions “the NAAQS would be unachievable (depending on the level of the standards) even if U.S.
emissions were reduced to zero.” This difficulty
could be circumvented by setting the NAAQS as a
percentage reduction in U.S. emissions rather than
a concentration in the atmosphere, as suggested by
former EPA General Counsel E. Donald Elliott.
Of course, past NAAQS have been set in ambient terms, and the statute refers to “ambient”
standards, but Elliott’s innovation finds strong support in the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron
v. NRDC. The Clean Air Act did not address the
precise question of how to set a numeric goal for
domestic regulation of a pollutant whose ambient
concentrations result from world-wide emissions.
Elliott’s innovation nullifies the argument that
emissions from other countries preclude a NAAQS
for greenhouse gases. However, emissions from
other countries do interfere with achieving existing NAAQS as the domestic ambient standards decreases and overseas emissions increase.

I

n sum, EPA argued that emissions from outside the United States are a reason against setting a NAAQS for greenhouse gases. What
was left unsaid is that emissions from outside
the United States are a reason for restructuring
the Clean Air Act’s treatment of existing NAAQS
pollutants.
The Bush ANPR argued that setting a NAAQS
is unworkable because “NAAQS are based purely
on preventing adverse health and environmental
impacts, rather than on considerations of cost, feasibility, or availability of technology,” yet costs inevitably figure in controlling greenhouse gas emissions. However, to avoid a backlash from Congress,
EPA has taken cost into account in setting NAAQS
for conventional pollutants under every administration, even though the statute requires the agency
to deny that it is doing so. The existing Clean Air
Act effectively requires EPA to lie.
In sum, EPA argued that the prohibition on considering costs in setting NAAQS is a reason against
setting a NAAQS for greenhouse gases. What was
left unsaid is that the prohibition on considering
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costs in setting NAAQS is a reason
for restructuring the Clean Air Act’s
treatment of conventional NAAQS
pollutants.
EPA, in the ANPR, argues that
“a NAAQS would trigger a relatively rigid implementation apparatus, limiting the agency’s flexibility
to target cost-effective emissions
reductions and to shift the burden
of control requirements among
different industries based on the
availability of new technological
approaches.”
EPA Administrator Russell E.
Train made essentially the same
argument against a NAAQS for
lead, claiming that regulating principally through a national rule on
lead in gasoline would be more
efficient and administratively simpler. Schoenbrod responded that
setting a NAAQS would not prevent EPA from controlling lead in
gasoline through a single national
regulation; EPA could obviate the
need for fuel regulations in SIPs by
setting a national regulation sufficient to achieve the NAAQS. (The
Train-Schoenbrod argument is in
an exchange of five letters posted
at www.nyls.edu/faculty/faculty_
profiles/david_schoenbrod/trainschoenbrod_correspondence.) This
counterargument was valid when
the Second Circuit interpreted the
Clean Air Act in 1976, but is not
valid now. Congress in its 1977 and
1990 amendments to the Clean Air
Act expanded the statutory requirements for SIPs from three pages to
79 pages. The new requirements including “reasonably available controls measures” for existing sources
make SIPs more rigid, complex, inefficient, and inefficacious.
A 2004 National Research
Council study concludes that the rigidity and procedural complexity of
the SIP process hobbles pollutioncontrol efforts. “The process now
mandates extensive amounts of . . .
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here is no doubt that created a transparent, top-down,
there is room to criticize and flexible regime to address
the Clean Air Act. The ground-level ozone in 20 states and
regulatory system would the District of Columbia.
Moreover, the agency’s authority
benefit if Congress could
make transparent and direct value to find similar flexibility to address
judgments regarding the regula- greenhouse gases under Section
tory approach and the division of 111 of the act appears to be limited
burden. With regard to congressio- only by politics, not the statute’s
nal action, the act of course would language. Under that authority,
benefit from a legislative tune-up. EPA could track the process of the
Clear legal mandates from Con- NOx program, creating a call for
gress, without the need for statu- coordinated state emission reductory interpretation and regulation, tion programs that would provide
would provide clarity to regulated many of the benefits of centralized
entities, allow investors to finance legislation. And because the agency
emissions reductions projects with devised the program under a similess litigation risk, and speed deliv- lar process, it could be coordinated
with other pollutant abatement
ery of environmental benefits.
programs.
But hopes for legislaThe ability to use
tion are likely frustrated
the authority under
by the fact that the arterSection 111 is more
ies of Congress are even
than a theory. Just this
more clogged than those
month, Justice Ruth
of EPA. Congress has
Bader Ginsburg all but
not amended a major
endorsed the authority
environmental statute
as the agency’s means
since 1990, which preTim Profeta
of making an “indates the rise of “Fight
Club Politics” with the Gingrich- formed assessment of competing
led House of 1995–96, and the interests,” including “the environpolitics surrounding environmental mental benefit potentially achievissues appear more and more polar- able,” “our nation’s energy needs,”
ized every day. Most directly, wit- and “the possibility of economic
ness the efforts of Senators Thomas disruption.” Clearly in the justice’s
Carper (D-DE) and Lamar Al- mind, the transparent balancing of
exander (R-TN), two moderates interests is feasible for EPA.
None of this is to suggest that
who have proposed legislation for
the past five Congresses that tracks the Clean Air Act is the perfect authe Schoenbrod/Witte proposals. thority for addressing our current
Never has the Carper/Alexander air pollution challenges. But our
proposal made it to the floor of the political system is particularly paralyzed at this inopportune juncture,
Senate for a vote.
EPA’s flexibility to address these making amendments unlikely.
issues also is understated. For ex- Until we are able to return to conample, the NOx trading program, structive legislating, the statutory
a program akin to the lauded stat- arteries given to EPA may not be
ute-based SO2 trading regime, was quite as clogged as suggested.
created through the much-criticized National Ambient Air Quali- Tim Profeta is the Director of the Nicholas
ty Standards/State Implementation Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions
Plan process. The NOx SIP Call at Duke University
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time and resources in a legalistic, and often frustrating proposal and review process, which focuses
primarily on compliance with intermediate process
steps. This process probably discourages innovation
and experimentation at the state and local levels; overtaxes the limited financial and human resources available to the nation’s [air quality management] system
at the state, local, and federal levels; and draws attention and resources away from the more germane issue
of ensuring progress towards the goal of meeting the
[NAAQS].”
The SIP process also interferes with market-based
regulation, thus resulting in great economic waste. As
Barack Obama pointed out during his presidential
campaign, “a cap-and-trade system is a smarter way of
controlling pollution” than “top-down” regulation in
which agencies specify “every single rule that a company has to abide by.” Market-based approaches are
more cost-effective because they give businesses flexibility to decide how and where to cut emissions.
Finally, SIPs are becoming less effective. In the
past, they made significant contributions to air quality, despite their emphasis on top-down regulation
rather than market-based regulation. Making progress
through top-down regulation was easier when many
large plants had yet to adopt inexpensive, end-of-thepipe pollution-control technologies, which regulators
could readily identify and require these large plants to
use. Now, however, the low-hanging fruit has largely
been picked; further progress requires more expensive control technologies, changes within production
processes, and the regulation of smaller sources. So
it is harder for regulators to identify sensible control
strategies, and top-down regulation has become less
efficient and effective.
In sum, EPA argued that the rigidity, inefficiency,
and inefficacy of the SIP process are reasons against
setting a NAAQS for greenhouse gases. What was left
unsaid is that they are also reasons for restructuring
the Clean Air Act’s treatment of the existing NAAQS
pollutants.

T

he Breaking the Logjam project has proposed how to restructure the Clean Air Act.
The leaders of the project — Richard B.
Stewart and Katrina M. Wyman plus Schoenbrod — brought together 50 diverse environmental law experts to propose and reflect upon
ways to modernize a wide spectrum of federal environmental statutes. The undertaking was built upon
four principles: adopt market-based tools wherever
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they can reliably achieve environmental goals; realign
the responsibilities of the federal government and the
states so that each level has more effective power over
the environmental problems it is best placed to address; face trade-offs openly and based on reliable information; and use cross-cutting regulatory approaches that address closely related problems together rather
than separately. At the end of a four-year process, the
leaders of the project published a book that includes
a proposal to restructure the Clean Air Act. (Breaking
the Logjam: Environmental Protection That Will Work,
Yale University Press, 2010).
The proposal is based on the most successful programs for limiting emissions:
• The regulation of new vehicles, which cut 99 percent of the emissions of three NAAQS-track pollutants from this source;
• The regulation of lead in gasoline, which eventually cut 100 percent of the emissions of another
NAAQS-track pollutant from this source;
• The regulation of acid-rain-causing emissions
from power plants, which cut approximately 50 percent of the emissions of some NAAQS-track pollutants from this source; and
• The regulation of stratospheric-ozone-destroying
chemicals, which is in the process of cutting emissions
100 percent.
These successes are due to three characteristics
shared by these programs: they used direct federal regulation; the decisions about who bore the burden of
cutting emissions, and how much they would be cut,
were made by Congress rather than fobbed off on a
bureaucratic process; and flexibility on how and where
to cut emissions was added through market-based
processes. Although these successful programs applied
for the most part to specific categories of sources of
NAAQS-track pollutants, it is important to see that
the NAAQS track as a whole lacks the characteristics
that made these particular programs successful. The
first two characteristics are lacking in SIPs and the
third is not easy to reconcile with the current version
of the Clean Air Act.
To emulate the key characteristics of those programs, the Breaking the Logjam project proposes that
Congress restructure the Clean Air Act’s treatment of
conventional NAAQS pollutants to regulate sources
rather than how the states regulate sources; decide
how much to cut pollution and how to allocate the
cleanup burden; and use market-based mechanisms
to give sources flexibility in making the cuts. This
implements the project’s first principle. To keep the
new program to manageable proportions, it should
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not attempt to regulate all sources. Rather, as the second principle suggests, it should cover only the biggest
sources — new vehicles, fuels, and several thousand of
the largest stationary sources. Together these account
for the lion’s share of controllable emissions. The remaining stationary sources, which are large in number
but relatively small in emissions, would be left to the
states, which would be largely freed from the SIP requirement.
The proposal calls for the direct federal controls
to take the form, largely, of cap-and-trade. Congress
should set the caps to decline over time and determine the method of distributing the allowances. The
reformed statute should establish backstops to remedy
any failure of the federal cap-and-trade system to perform as expected; any backsliding by states or harmful
interstate spillovers; hot spots; or shortfalls in achieving NAAQS.
The Obama administration is now calling for an
approach to greenhouses gases that involves direct
federal regulation of sources, focusing on the most
important sources at the federal level, and eventually market-based mechanisms. These elements make
sense, whatever might be said of the program as a
whole. What is left unsaid is that the same elements
make sense for conventional NAAQS pollutants,
which would require reforming the Clean Air Act. On
that, the Obama administration has yet to lead.

T

he Breaking the Logjam project urged the
111th Congress to restructure the Clean Air
Act as part of the legislation to restrict greenhouse gases. Diverse individuals in Congress
responded that, while the arguments for
such restructuring made sense, Congress needed to
focus on regulating greenhouse gases alone. But Congress fell short on that.
Actually, it would be easier for a future Congress to
resolve the greenhouse gas issue if conventional pollutants are part of the mix. In July 2010, the utility
industry proposed to support legislation that would
subject its greenhouse gas emissions to a cap-andtrade program if environmental groups agreed to a bill
freezing new regulations of the industry’s conventional
pollutants. The industry’s proposal shows that the savings in the cost of controlling conventional pollutants
would ease the passage of controls on greenhouse gases. The problem with the industry’s proposal was that
it would have bought greenhouse gas controls at the
expense of harm to health from conventional pollutants. Instead, the country could have obtained the cost

savings that would ease the passage of greenhouse gas
controls along with better protection of health from
conventional pollutants by restructuring the Clean Air
Act’s treatment of these pollutants.
Eliminating the waste inherent in the present
Clean Air Act would not only ease a legislative deal on
climate, but also help protect the environment from
the harm that comes from this waste of energy and
material. In greening our economy, a good place to
start is with pollution control itself.
Combining reform of the Clean Air Act with
greenhouse gas control would facilitate legislative action in another way. Failing to reform the act’s control of NAAQS pollutants would increase the cost of
controlling greenhouse gases. The most efficient way
to control greenhouse gases is through a market-based
system, such as cap-and-trade or an emissions tax, but
much of the cost savings from a market-based approach to greenhouse gases would be lost if the act
still took its top-down approach to NAAQS pollutants. Because the same sources emit both kinds of
pollutants, they would lose much of the flexibility
that brings the cost savings in controlling greenhouse
gases if they are still subject to top-down regulation for
NAAQS pollutants. To make matters worse, regulatory requirements for conventional NAAQS pollutants
change frequently, often on a pollutant-by-pollutant
basis. The detailed, changing, top-down Clean Air Act
regulation of conventional NAAQS pollutants would
limit a business’s ability to shape long-term investments or research plans to take advantage of a market
system to control greenhouse gases. Thus, the cost savings from market-based control of greenhouse gases
would be significantly reduced.
There is additional money (and resources and greenhouse gas emissions) to be saved if Congress deals with
greenhouse gases and conventional pollutants together
rather than separately. One reason is that steps to cut
greenhouse gases often reduce conventional pollutants.
The Breaking the Logjam book details the synergies.
The potential savings are huge. The United Kingdom
has determined that Britain’s tackling of greenhouse
gases and conventional pollutants together rather than
separately would produce co-benefits of £24 billion by
2050. The book shows how to combine conventional
and greenhouse gas programs to realize the much larger
co-benefits achievable in the United States.
Reforming the Clean Air Act’s treatment of
conventional pollutants would both ease political
resolution of the greenhouse gas issue and improve
control of conventional pollutants. It’s time to wake
up to this basic idea and take action. •
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